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MISSED OPPORTUNITY: FURTHERING
FAIR HOUSING IN THE HOUSING
CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM
STACY SEICSHNAYDRE*
I
INTRODUCTION
The premier rental housing program created in part to reduce isolation of
low-income renters is marked by a series of missed opportunities to provide
expanded housing choice and upward socioeconomic mobility for those harmed
by racial and economic segregation. From the outset, the Housing Choice
Voucher (HCV) Program was beset by widely recognized structural flaws
limiting housing choice, which have persisted for decades. The use of vouchers
to assist families displaced by wide-scale public-housing demolitions and
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina exemplifies that the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) never structured the
program to address segregation, deconcentrate low-income persons, expand
housing choice, or further fair housing. HUD’s issuance of a new Fair Housing
Act (FHA) rule, designed to affirmatively further fair housing, explicitly
imposes detailed fair housing planning obligations on the public-housing
authorities (PHAs) that administer voucher programs. These obligations
provide the potential, yet again, for the HCV Program to achieve its intended
purpose and expand housing choice for all.
Part I of the article describes the HCV Program’s structure, purpose, and
failure to fulfill its potential for expanding housing choice. In particular, part I
discusses several structural flaws known by HUD since the program’s inception,
including failure to establish neighborhood-level rents, failure to administer the
HCV Program regionally, failure to require that program participants be
informed about housing choices, and general failure to affirmatively further fair
housing in the HCV Program. Part II discusses the role of informed housing
choice in transforming the HCV from a short-term instrument of survival to a
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long-term tool of opportunity. Part III conducts a case study using the dramatic
expansion of HCV use in post-Katrina New Orleans following the hurricanes
and accelerated public housing demolitions; this case study examines the
clustering of vouchers and the extent to which the HCV Program delivers
housing choice in a nondiscriminatory manner. Part V proposes tools for
reforming the historical flaws in the HCV Program to affirmatively further fair
housing.
II
THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF HOUSING VOUCHERS TO EXPAND HOUSING
CHOICE AND COMBAT EXISTING SEGREGATION
Affordable housing strategies include both “supply-side” and “demand1
side” approaches. The HCV Program is a demand-side approach relying on the
private market to rent to low-income tenants in exchange for a subsidy. Supplyside approaches include building hard units of public housing administered by
public-housing authorities, or creating tax incentives for private developers to
build affordable units. Both approaches are necessary for a comprehensive
affordable housing strategy that furthers fair housing and promotes inclusive
communities.
2
The HCV Program is the largest national rental assistance program. The
structure of the program has remained essentially the same since Congress
3
created it in 1974 as the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. The HCV
Program is administered by local PHAs. Participants are responsible for finding
suitable housing in the private market and must pay at least thirty percent of
their monthly adjusted gross income on rent and utilities. The PHA pays a
subsidy to the landlord to help cover the difference between what the tenant
can afford and the payment standard—what the PHA considers a reasonable
4
rent. The typical voucher household is very low-income at twenty-two percent
5
of the area median.

1. See JILL KHADDURI, KIMBERLY BURNETT & DAVID RODDA, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., TARGETING HOUSING PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES, LITERATURE REVIEW 3 (2003),
https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/targetinglitreview.pdf.
2. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, LOUISIANA FACT SHEET: THE HOUSING CHOICE
VOUCHER PROGRAM (2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-10-14hous-factsheets
_la.pdf (last updated July 6, 2015).
3. INGRID GOULD ELLEN & JESSICA YAGER, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., RACE,
POVERTY, AND FEDERAL RENTAL HOUSING POLICY, HUD AT 50: CREATING PATHWAYS TO
OPPORTUNITY 103, 106 (2015), https://www.huduser.gov/hud50th/HUDat50Book.pdf.
4. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. (HUD), HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS FACT
SHEET (2015), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program
_section_8.
5. Kirk McClure, Which Metropolitan Areas Work Best for Poverty Deconcentration with Housing
Choice Vouchers?, 15 CITYSCAPE 209, 210 (2013), http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/cityscpe/
vol15num3/ch15.pdf.
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The HCV Program, as the current name suggests, provides the potential for
greater housing choice and socioeconomic mobility for low-income families that
participate. Vouchers create the possibility that families, armed with data and
information, can exercise choices about where to live. By extension, such
choices might open up areas of greater opportunity for families than
traditionally available to them, such as neighborhoods with fewer
environmental and health hazards, higher quality schools, and job growth.
Indeed, an objective of the 1974 Act authorizing the Section 8 program includes
“the reduction of the isolation of income groups within communities and
geographical areas and the promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality
of neighborhoods through the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities
6
for persons of lower income. . . .”
Despite its purpose, the HCV Program on the whole fails to deconcentrate
voucher families or give them access to opportunity. Voucher families live near
lower performing schools than low-income families receiving no housing
7
assistance at all. A national study examining voucher use in the fifty most
populous metro areas from 2000 to 2008 finds that “households using vouchers
are more economically and racially segregated than an extremely low-income
8
comparison group.” Although the expansion of voucher use nationally has
been tied to the idea of poverty deconcentration, studies have shown that
voucher programs frequently perpetuate the poverty and racial concentration
9
they are intended to challenge.
In fact, the HCV Program is not even structured to ensure poverty
10
deconcentration, especially for minority households. From the outset, HUD
incorporated, and later failed to remedy, structural features in the Section 8
program that undermined Congress’s explicit goal of reducing isolation of
income groups in the program. These structural features also failed to further
fair housing by compromising housing choice and perpetuating racial and
11
economic segregation. These features include the creation of a single-voucher
payment standard for an entire region, which steered voucher families to the
lowest-cost neighborhoods; the failure to ensure regional administration of

6. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (HCDA), 42 U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6) (1999).
7. Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 114.
8. Molly W. Metzger, The Reconcentration of Poverty: Patterns of Housing Voucher Use, 2000 to
2008, 24 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 544, 544 (2014).
9. See id.; Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and
Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 HOW. L.J. 913, 925-26 (2005) (“[U]se of Section 8 for
desegregation and deconcentration has been very rare.”); see also Elizabeth Julian, “Deconcentration”
as Policy: HUD and Housing Policy in the 1990s, The Nimby Report 5 (March 2004) (“While the tenant
based Section 8 program established in the mid-1970s theoretically offered an opportunity for low
income families to escape concentrated poverty, such an opportunity was never the reality for minority
families.”).
10. See Kirk McClure, Alex F. Schwartz & Lydia B. Taghavi, Housing Choice Voucher Location
Patterns a Decade Later, 25 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 215, 215, 233 (2015).
11. See infra Section I.D.
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vouchers or facilitate freedom of movement throughout the region; the failure
to require counseling and search assistance to help voucher families make
informed housing choices based on data and other information related to
neighborhood opportunity; and the failure to ensure that voucher programs
12
complied with the affirmative mandates of the FHA.
A. Regional Fair Market Rents for Vouchers Limit Housing Choice
HUD has traditionally determined the payment standard for the HCV
Program by setting a single “fair market rent” at the fortieth or fiftieth
13
percentile of rents for the entire metropolitan area. The structure of the rentpayment standard is an impediment to housing choice because it steers voucher
14
holders to the lowest-income neighborhoods in a metropolitan region. The
flaws in the regional payment standard have not come to light in recent years;
15
HUD has been aware of them for decades.
In 1977, the Comptroller General issued a Report to the Congress entitled
16
“Major Changes are Needed in the New Leased-Housing Program.” The
problems noted as hindering the program included setting fair market rents
17
(FMR) “too low for program success.” The report specifically noted that
“HUD’s decision to prepare single FMR schedules for entire [metropolitan
areas] is questionable. [This decision] ignores important distinctions between
metropolitan central cities and suburban areas as well as among suburban
18
areas . . . .” In this regard, the report recommended that HUD “develop
separate FMR schedules for individual housing submarket areas instead of one
19
FMR schedule for an entire [metro area or county group]. . . .”
Despite a recommendation in 1977 that HUD alter its method of setting
rents for the HCV Program, HUD did not remedy this impediment to housing
choice until 2010 in response to litigation. A Dallas civil rights organization, the
Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), filed a complaint in 2007 challenging
HUD’s method of setting a single fair market rent for the twelve-county metro
Dallas region as steering black Section 8 participants into predominantly
20
minority areas. HUD then announced a demonstration project in which it
would set rents according to “small areas” in certain selected metropolitan
12. See infra Sections I.A–D.
13. Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 106 (also stating the payment standard is calculated at 90 to 110
percent of the fair market rent).
14. Id. at 116.
15. See infra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, B-171630, MAJOR CHANGES ARE NEEDED IN THE NEW
LEASED-HOUSING PROGRAM (1977).
17. Id. at 1.
18. Id. at 21.
19. Id. at 29.
20. Complaint at 25, Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development, No. 3-07CV0945 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2007). The author is a member of the
Board of Directors of ICP.
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21

regions, including Dallas. In its announcement of the demonstration project,
HUD stated that it expected “small area FMRs [to] provide Section 8 tenants
with greater ability to move into opportunity areas where jobs, transportation,
and educational opportunities exist, and prevent undue subsidy in lower-rent
22
areas.”
A key obstacle to addressing the payment standard is the assumption that
increased rents in high-opportunity areas would increase net program costs and
limit the number of households able to participate in the program. This tension
between maximizing the number of people served, regardless of location, and
maximizing choice and access to high-opportunity neighborhoods runs
23
throughout HUD’s housing programs. A recent study of the Dallas
demonstration project, however, found that “zip code-level rent ceilings causes
rent increases in expensive neighborhoods and decreases in low-cost
24
neighborhoods, with little change in aggregate rents.” Moreover, the study’s
authors noted that while generic rent increases in the voucher program
primarily benefited landlords without improving neighborhood quality, a “ZIP
code policy improves neighborhood quality for voucher recipients
25
substantially.” Thus, despite the misnomer of the metro-wide “fair market”
rent, it appears HUD has been paying premium rent in low-cost neighborhoods
and below-market rent in high-opportunity neighborhoods.
HUD issued a Proposed Rule on June 16, 2016, proposing the use of Small
Area FMRs in place of the current single FMR approach in certain
26
metropolitan areas. These small-area FMRs are designed “to address high
levels of voucher concentration” and “to provide HCV tenants with a greater
ability to move into areas where jobs, transportation, and educational
27
opportunities exist.”

21. Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program—Notice of Demonstration Project, 75 Fed. Reg.
27,808, 27,809 (May 18, 2010); see also Proposed Fair Market Rents for the Housing Choice Voucher
Program and Moderate Rehabilitation Single Room Occupancy Program Fiscal Year 2011, 75 Fed.
Reg. 46958 (August 4, 2010).
22. 75 Fed. Reg. at 27,808. After the demonstration program in which voucher rents were set by zip
code ended, ICP challenged HUD’s subsequent decision to decrease rents in white-area zip codes and
to increase rents in zip codes with high poverty rates. See Complaint at ¶ 2, Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc. v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, No. 14-cv-01465 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 22, 2014).
23. Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 104.
24. ROBERT A. COLLINSON & PETER GANONG, THE INCIDENCE OF HOUSING VOUCHER
GENEROSITY (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2255799.
25. Id.
26. Establishing a More Effective Fair Market Rent System; Using Small Area Fair Market Rents
th
in Housing Choice Voucher Program Instead of the Current 50 Percentile FMRs, Proposed Rule, 81
Fed. Reg. 39,218 (June 16, 2016).
27. Id.
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B. The HCV Program Lacks Regional Administration and Fails to Promote
Regional Mobility
The irony of the regional “fair market rent” approach is that traditionally
there is nothing regional about housing voucher administration. The voucher
programs are administered by local city and county housing authorities
operating within submarkets of a region, subjecting households to bureaucratic
obstacles and duplicative requirements when they want to cross jurisdictional
28
lines between city and suburb or between suburbs. HUD has been aware of
29
the potential benefits of regional voucher administration for decades. The
Comptroller General recommended regional administration of the voucher
program in its 1977 report, encouraging “the formation of PHAs with regional,
metropolitan, and/or State-wide jurisdiction to give certificate holders greater
30
mobility and freedom of choice within market areas.” In addition to the fair
housing benefits of regional voucher administration, the 1977 report also noted
the economic efficiencies of “aggregat[ing] allocations for several communities
31
or jurisdictions [so as to create] a PHA with area-wide responsibility.” In the
years ahead, HUD will operate in an increasingly tight fiscal environment,
lending greater urgency to “regional collaboration and pooling of resources
32
among housing authorities” to achieve “economies of scale.” In the summer of
2014, HUD issued a proposed rule that seeks to increase administrative
efficiencies for PHAs to form consortia for the purpose of administering
33
voucher programs. The proposed rule is designed to maximize resident
housing choice by removing administrative burdens associated with using
34
vouchers across jurisdictional lines within a region. This is a positive
development, but without concrete incentives, it is unclear whether PHAs will
volunteer to collaborate with one another.
C. No Requirement to Inform Voucher Families of Their Housing Choices
There is no requirement that counseling be provided to inform voucher
households of the myriad characteristics of neighborhoods within a region,
including: educational options and quality measures assigned to public schools;
employment and transportation resources; demographic information, such as

28. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 16, at 45 (“A family that wishes greater mobility . . .
will have to qualify and be certified in each PHA jurisdiction in which it plans to shop for housing and
will have to fulfill a number of duplicative requirements . . .”); see also Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at
125 (recommending greater portability of vouchers).
29. See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
30. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 16, at 56.
31. Id. at 55.
32. Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 124 (noting the fair housing benefits of regional collaboration
among housing authorities).
33. Streamlining Requirements Applicable to Formation of Consortia by Public Housing Agencies,
79 Fed. Reg. 40,019, 40,020 (July 11, 2014).
34. Id. at 40,021.
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poverty rates; environmental quality and public safety features; and social
35
supports. Yet HUD has known for decades that “choice” is dependent on
information. The Comptroller General recommended in its 1977 Report that
PHAs “promote greater choice of housing by . . . advising families of their
opportunity to lease housing in [all areas in which the PHA is not legally barred
36
from entering contracts] . . . .”
The housing counseling “mobility” programs initially arose from litigation,
the first being the Gautreaux program in Chicago created in 1976 by consent
37
38
decree. More recently, programs have emerged in Dallas and Baltimore.
HUD initiated research demonstrations motivated by the early, positive
39
Gautreaux findings. The mobility programs have generally coupled counseling
and search assistance with special-purpose housing vouchers available for use in
40
neighborhoods that are low poverty or less racially segregated.
Pre-move mobility counseling increases the ability of voucher families to
find housing in low-poverty neighborhoods and post-move counseling helps
41
families remain there. In HUD’s Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing
(MTO) research demonstration, families with no search assistance or housing
counseling moved to neighborhoods with “significantly higher poverty and
crime rates” compared with families who received assistance and were
42
restricted to using vouchers in low-poverty areas. Experts recommend that
pre-move counseling “should seek the best-possible initial placements for
43
families, not the quickest placements.” Post-move counseling can target
problems with landlords and units, which constituted the major causes of
44
tenants leaving units in the MTO program. Nationally, both black and white
families exit poor neighborhoods over time, but black families are “much more
45
likely to fall back into poor areas through subsequent moves.”
A vast array of literature documents the link between neighborhoods,
46
physical and mental health, and life prospects. Early research of the Gautreaux
35. See Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 125 (recommending a requirement that neighborhood
information be provided to voucher holders).
36. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 16, at 44.
37. Alexander Polikoff, Racial Inequality and the Black Ghetto, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 10
(2006).
38. See infra notes 91, 94, 95, 97 and accompanying text.
39. Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 115.
40. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & SUSAN J. POPKIN, URBAN INSTITUTE, WHY HOUSING CHOICE
AND MOBILITY MATTER (2010). But see Xavier de Souza Briggs & Margery Austin Turner, Assisted
Housing Mobility and the Success of Low-Income Minority Families: Lessons for Policy, Practice, and
Future Research, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 25, 58 (2006) (noting that some families may be better
served by services addressing readiness to move rather than by mobility counseling).
41. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 39–41.
42. Id. at 33.
43. Id. at 40.
44. Id. at 41.
45. Id. at 39.
46. XAVIER DE SOUZA BRIGGS, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS, THE GEOGRAPHY OF
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program documented that families who moved to suburban, resource-rich
Chicago neighborhoods achieved meaningful gains in education, employment,
47
and long-term earnings. For example, children in the Gautreaux mobility
program who moved to suburbs were more likely than children from similar
families moving within Chicago to complete high school, take college-track
48
courses, attend college, and enter the work force. More recent research shows
that Gautreaux women who moved to integrated, resource-rich neighborhoods
49
spent significantly more time employed and considerably less time on welfare.
In the MTO demonstration of the mid-1990s, HUD provided mobility
counseling and search assistance to families living in public and assisted housing
projects—in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York—who
50
agreed to use vouchers in census tracts with poverty rates below ten percent.
The most substantial findings relate to improvements in physical and mental
health and perceptions of safety for women and adolescent girls. In particular,
women and girls “enjoyed significant improvements in mental health, including
reductions in psychological distress and depression and increasing feelings of
51
calm and peacefulness.” Qualitative research suggests that escaping from
environments in which adolescent girls were targets for sexual harassment and
52
pressure “appears to offer a tremendous sense of relief and freedom,”
contributing to short-term health and well-being as well as potential long-term
benefits, such as staying in school. Participants in the MTO demonstration cited
53
the desire to escape unsafe places as their primary motivation for moving.
Although an interim evaluation found no evidence that MTO contributed to
significant educational, employment, or earnings gains, and further indicated
54
that MTO boys did not share the benefits enjoyed by MTO girls, more recent
evidence gathered from tax returns shows that MTO children who were
younger than age thirteen when their families moved to lower-poverty
neighborhoods experienced significant improvements in college attendance
55
rates and earnings. The study finds that “every year spent in a better area
during childhood increases college attendance rates and earnings in adulthood”;
OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 7 (2015).
47. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 45.
48. James E. Rosenbaum, Changing the Geography of Opportunity by Expanding Residential
Choice: Lessons from the Gautreaux Program, 6 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 231, 263–64 (1995).
49. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 48–49.
50. Turner & Popkin, supra note 40, at 4.
51. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 45. The research also noted significant reductions in rates of
adult obesity. Id.
52. Id. at 48.
53. Id. at 49.
54. Turner & Popkin, supra note 40, at 5 (few MTO families moved to suburbs or integrated
neighborhoods and few stayed in low-poverty neighborhoods).
55. RAJ CHETTY, NATHANIEL HENDREN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE
TO BETTER NEIGHBORHOODS ON CHILDREN: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY
EXPERIMENT 23 (2015), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/files/mto_paper.pdf.
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this finding is “consistent with recent evidence that the duration of exposure to
a better environment during childhood is a key determinant of an individual’s
56
long-term outcomes.” The mobility research confirms what many already
know about housing opportunity: it is linked to many other kinds of
transformative life opportunities.
D. Government Failure to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing in the HCV
Program
The FHA has always obligated PHAs, as HUD program participants, not
only to refrain from discrimination, but also to “take actions to address
segregation and related barriers . . . as often reflected in racially or ethnically
57
concentrated areas of poverty.” HUD has been aware of the structural barriers
58
to housing choice in the voucher program for decades. In 1977, the Office of
the Comptroller General in its Report to Congress specifically discussed
“Impediments to Furthering the Deconcentration Goal” of the Act authorizing
59
the Section 8 program. After describing the voucher program as “the major
vehicle for deconcentration,” the Report reiterated the role that low FMRs
played in restrict[ing] shoppers’ choices to housing of marginal quality in
60
minority and lower income areas.” Although some officials stated they would
not approve leasing units in “blighted areas, high-crime areas, and areas
characterized by air pollution, rodent infestation, and other serious
environmental deficiencies,” others saw “little choice” but to approve leases in
these blighted neighborhoods so long as the units met the program’s “quality”
61
standards.
A year later, in 1978, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed
whether HUD’s administration of the Section 8 program was achieving the
legislative objective of reducing isolation and deconcentrating housing for low62
income persons. The GAO made three key findings:
1. Key HUD housing and community development personnel are not sure
whether deconcentration is a prime objective of the Section 8 program,
2. HUD has provided little formal direction in defining deconcentration or
in establishing procedures to achieve it, and

56. Id.
57. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272, 42,274 (July 16,
2015).
58. See infra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
59. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 16, at 42–45.
60. Id. at 43.
61. Id. at 43–44.
62. Letter from the Director of the U.S. General Accounting Office to the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development, B-17163 (Oct. 20, 1978), http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/124496.pdf.
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3. the extent of deconcentration achieved through the Section 8 program is
not readily determinable because HUD has not developed the criteria
63
needed to measure this factor.
The GAO recommended that HUD clearly define the deconcentration
objective of the Section 8 program, issue guidelines to assist field offices to meet
the objective, and develop a system for measuring results that would include
64
measurement criteria, goals, and data-collection mechanisms. One of the most
notable recommendations in the 1978 letter was the warning that “steps should
65
be taken now, before substantial numbers of units are occupied.”
66
Although HUD has undertaken some demonstration programs, it has
resisted the kind of structural change required to remove barriers to housing
67
choice in the voucher program. In July 2015, however, HUD issued a Final
Rule interpreting its obligation to ensure that its programs and activities be
68
administered in a manner that affirmatively furthers fair housing. This Rule is
much-anticipated, comprehensive regulatory guidance “designed to improve
the fair housing planning process by providing better data and greater clarity to
the steps that program participants must undertake “ to meet their affirmative
69
fair housing mandates. The purpose of the new Rule is to “aid program
participants in taking meaningful actions to overcome historic patterns of
segregation, promote fair housing choice, and foster inclusive communities that
70
are free from discrimination.” This purpose closely mirrors HUD’s definition
71
of affirmatively furthering fair housing.
In the new Rule, HUD has replaced the requirement that grantees prepare
an analysis of impediments with the Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH). HUD
commits to provide all stakeholders, including PHAs, “with local and regional
data on patterns of integration and segregation, racially or ethnically
concentrated areas of poverty, access to housing and key community assets that
afford opportunity [including education, employment, low-poverty
neighborhoods,
transportation,
and
environmental
health],
and
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Ellen & Yager, supra note 3, at 115 (discussing the Regional Opportunity Counseling
Program of 1997); see also, e.g., U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 16, at 57–58.
67. See, e.g., Robert Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: A Back-tothe-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively Further” Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125
(2012) (comprehensively reviewing HUD’s AFFH regulations, guidance, enforcement, and inaction
leading up to the new rule).
68. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015). The
obligation to affirmatively further fair housing applies to all executive branch departments and agencies
administering housing and urban development programs. Id; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3608.
69. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,273.
70. 24 C.F.R. § 5.150 (2015).
71. 24 C.F.R. § 5.152 (2015).
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disproportionate housing needs” of groups protected by the FHA. HUD will
provide data and an assessment tool tailored to each category of program
73
participant.
Since 1998, PHAs have had to certify in their annual plans that they will
74
affirmatively further fair housing, and they must continue to do so under the
75
new Rule. The new certification means that the PHA will take meaningful
actions to further the goals in the AFH and “that it will take no action that is
materially inconsistent with its obligation to affirmatively further fair
76
housing.” A PHA will be in compliance with its Affirmatively Furthering Fair
77
Housing Rule certification if it examines its programs, identifies fair housing
issues and contributing factors within its programs, specifies actions and
strategies to address those as well as AFH goals (in a reasonable manner in
light of available resources), works with jurisdictions on the Rule’s initiatives
78
requiring PHA involvement, and maintains corresponding records. In a
response to public comment, HUD recognizes “lack of information about
housing opportunities in more affluent or diverse neighborhoods” as an
79
impediment that limits choice. The new Rule requires for the first time both
that PHAs prepare an AFH every five years and that they incorporate
80
strategies and actions furthering fair housing into their Annual Plans. PHAs
may, and are encouraged to, collaborate on their AFH’s with other program
participants, such as local and state governments, regional entities, and other
81
PHAs.
As HUD makes explicit, the duty to affirmatively further fair housing is
82
statutory—“not an administrative requirement that can be waived by HUD.”
HUD may reject an AFH if it finds that it is “inconsistent with fair housing or
83
civil rights requirements or is substantially incomplete.” One expert
characterizes the Rule, however, as “long on ‘carrots’ but painfully short on
‘sticks,’” such that the mandate will be realized “only in communities where

72. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,348.
73. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d) (2015).
74. See Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,274 n.3 (detailing
statutory planning and certification requirements).
75. 24 C.F.R. § 903.7(o) (2015).
76. Id.
77. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,308.
78. 24 C.F.R. § 903.7(o)(3) (2015).
79. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,308. HUD notes that
PHAs are already scored on factors promoting choice relating to landlord outreach and tenant
counseling activities. Id. These activities should not be merely incentivized, but required. See id.
80. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d)(5) (2015). HUD notes that prior analyses of impediments were not
coordinated with the PHA Annual Plans. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 42,348.
81. 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.156; 903.15 (2015).
82. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,348.
83. 24 C.F.R. §5.162(b) (2015).
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grassroots and legal advocates mobilize and create their own enforcement
84
strategies.” Even then, the new Rule maintains the enduring reality that “the
key to current enforcement of [affirmative fair housing] mandates lies with
HUD, either through action prompted by a lawsuit, a privately initiated
administrative complaint to HUD under the FHA, or on HUD’s own
85
initiative.” The problem is that HUD’s “civil rights record has been timid at
best and [it] has often viewed its main stakeholders as the very local86
government grantees whose exclusionary policies must be changed.” The Rule
encourages positive development, however, in the context of voucher
administration; PHAs, like all federal grant recipients, “will be required to have
an honest conversation about segregation and devise a local plan to dismantle
87
it.”
III
HOUSING CHOICE FOR ALL?
The housing choices and mobility of African Americans are uniquely
fraught and politicized. Yet policy debates about which housing choices are best
miss the larger point that low-income households of color historically have had
88
minimal neighborhood choice and mobility in the marketplace. Expanding fair
housing choice is aimed at reducing economic, racial, and social isolation;
increasing freedom of movement; and creating a more balanced menu of
housing options for all families. Fair housing is informed choice; it is not
89
presumptive of any particular choice.
As noted by housing researchers and policy analysts, “Contrary to the
skepticism that the minority poor strongly prefer to live among ‘their own,’
many low-income families . . . will volunteer for the opportunity to move from
high-poverty areas, typically inner cities, to better neighborhoods in the same
90
cities or in the surrounding suburbs.” Many housing-mobility counseling
programs document far greater demand for their programs than available
openings. For example, 13,000 households applied for just 2,000 restricted
vouchers offered through a litigation-born mobility program in the Baltimore

84. MICHAEL ALLEN, FURMAN CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POLICY, HUD’S NEW
AFFH RULE: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUND GAME (Sept. 2015), http://furmancenter.org/
research/iri/essay/huds-new-affh-rule-the-importance-of-the-ground-game.
85. Schwemm, supra note 67, at 166.
86. Id. at 176.
87. Allen, supra note 84.
88. See supra notes 35–36; 58–61 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 95–97 and
accompanying text.
89. See Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,354; 24 C.F.R.
§5.152 (2015) (stating that HUD defines choice to include actual choice, protected choice, and
“[e]nabled choice, which means realistic access to sufficient information regarding options so that any
choice is informed”).
90. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 31–32.
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91

region; the Gautreaux program applicants far exceeded program capacity for
92
most of the program’s operation. Whereas families who were involuntarily
displaced through public-housing demolition programs such as HOPE VI
reported a loss of supportive ties, other families who participated, presumably
voluntarily, in mobility programs reported no support networks at all in their
93
starting-point neighborhoods and weak links to institutions there. One woman
who chose to participate in the Dallas mobility program admitted she had not
yet built a social network in her new suburban neighborhood, but neither had
she heard a gunshot: “‘I’m going to stay out here,’ she said. ‘I’m not going
94
back.’”
Scholars have found that low-income families’ perceptions of their housing
options are shaped by years of living in public housing, concentrated poverty,
and racial isolation, so they “tend to value housing units over neighborhood
quality, because they spend much of their time in the home in order to ‘keep to
95
themselves’ and avoid violence.” Research documents dramatic improvements
in perceptions of neighborhood quality for families participating in assisted
96
housing mobility efforts. As noted by one participant in the Baltimore
Housing Mobility Program, which assists voucher holders to move from publichousing neighborhoods to high-opportunity neighborhoods, “It’s only in leaving
that I started growing and wanting to do different things, learn different things
97
and be something different.” Depending on how it is used, therefore, the
voucher can serve as a short-term instrument of survival or a long-term tool of
opportunity. An examination of voucher use by families displaced by publichousing demolitions and Hurricane Katrina illustrates this dichotomy.
IV
HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS AS A POST-KATRINA RECOVERY TOOL IN NEW
ORLEANS: SHORT-TERM SURVIVAL OR LONG-TERM OPPORTUNITY?
The significance of the HCV Program in the New Orleans metro area postKatrina cannot be overstated; the number of housing vouchers in use in Orleans
98
Parish alone more than tripled from 2000 to 2010. Housing vouchers were a
91. Turner & Popkin, supra note 40, at 4.
92. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 32.
93. See Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 37 (noting that in the MTO research demonstration
program, there was “no mean impact on social support for the experimental group as a whole”).
94. Binyamin Appelbaum, Vouchers Help Families Move Far From Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 2015, at A1.
95. Jennifer Darrah & Stefanie DeLuca, “Living Here Has Changed My Whole Perspective”: How
Escaping Inner City Poverty Shapes Neighborhood and Housing Choice, 33 J. POL. ANALYSIS MGMT.
350, 354 (2014).
96. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 43.
97. Stefanie DeLuca & Jessi Stafford, Finding Home: Voices of the Baltimore Housing Mobility
Program, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION (2014), http://apps.tcf.org/finding-home.
98. A Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (2000, 2010),
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/about.html.
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primary means of assisting households displaced by Katrina, especially
following demolitions of public-housing units that housed over 5,000 low99
income households before the storm. Data regarding the use of housing
vouchers by low-income renters is presented in the pre- and post-disaster New
100
Orleans housing markets. The data presentation is followed by an analysis of
market barriers to the use of housing vouchers and proposed tools for reform.
A. The Role of Housing Vouchers in the Post-Katrina Recovery Landscape
HUD reports 17,347 vouchers used in Orleans Parish in 2010, up from about
101
8,400 in 2005 and 4,763 in 2000. In the entire metropolitan area (including
Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist,
and St. Tammany Parishes), there were 25,439 voucher households in 2010,
102
compared with 7,978 in 2000.
Many former public-housing residents and other low-income households
received housing vouchers after they were displaced by Katrina and the
103
demolition of nearly 5,000 public-housing units.
The public-housing
developments demolished since Katrina have been rebuilt, but gradually, on a
smaller scale, and in a mixed-income fashion, reducing the number of public104
housing units on-site to slightly more than 600. Housing administrators
justified public-housing demolitions, which were underway even before the
storm, based on high-poverty concentrations and poor living conditions pre105
Katrina. Meanwhile, the reliance on the private market to fill the affordable
housing gap neglected to account for the post-disaster housing shortage—over
fifty percent of New Orleans rental units were destroyed—and the reluctance of

99. Gwen Filosa, Demolition Approved for New Orleans’ Public Housing, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept.
21, 2007), http://blog.nola.com/times-picayune/2007/09/demolition_approved_for_new_or.html.
100. See McClure, Schwartz & Taghavi, supra note 10, at 219-21 (explaining that privacy restrictions
limit public access to voucher unit addresses). HUD makes available, and this article utilizes, the census
tract locations where vouchers are being used. HUD provides 2010 voucher location data using census
tracts drawn in 2000. Census tract locations do not provide the most granular picture of neighborhood
conditions experienced by voucher households; census tracts may be too large to reveal the clustering
of voucher households within the tracts. Nevertheless, the data do provide insight on broad patterns of
occupancy and access to opportunity.
101. Picture of Subsidized Households, HUD, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/picture
/yearlydata.html (compiling query data using year options 2000, 2004–2007, and 2010, Orleans Parish
for the Summary Level option, and Housing Choice Vouchers for the Program option).
102. Id.
103. Filosa, supra note 99.
104. Katy Reckdahl, End of an Era for New Orleans Public Housing, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://theadvocate.com/news/neworleans/6625562-148/photos-iberville-demolitionmarks-end; Richard Webster, New Orleans Public Housing Remade after Katrina. Is it Working?,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2015/08/new_orleans_public_
housing_dem.html.
105. MARY AUSTIN TURNER, BARIKA X. WILLIAMS, GLENN KATES, SUSAN J. POPKIN & CAROL
RABENHORST, URBAN INSTITUTE, AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING IN HEALTHY COMMUNITIES:
REBUILDING AFTER HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA 8–9 (May 2007).
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many jurisdictions to bring back, much less create new, rental housing. As
noted in The New Orleans Index at Five, efforts to redevelop and reform
affordable rental housing post-Katrina “d[id] not equal the scale of the housing
lost or provide enough affordable homes to those who lost a home they could
107
afford pre-Katrina.” It is difficult to determine exactly where the displaced
low-income residents are using the vouchers now, but an analysis of voucher use
in the metro area before and after Katrina provides some insight on this
question.
The transition from project-based (supply-side) rental assistance to tenantbased (demand-side) assistance reflects a federal policy shift and is consistent
with national trends. For example, from 1995 through 2012, approximately
500,000 units of public housing and privately owned assisted housing were
demolished or discontinued, whereas Congress funded 800,000 additional
108
housing vouchers in the same period. As of 2012, there were 2.2 million
109
households assisted with housing vouchers nationwide.
Wider housing choice may assist families with children, thirty-nine percent
of whom lived in poverty in New Orleans in 2013, overcome the documented
negative health effects of living in poverty. As noted in a recent report by The
Data Center, “Scientific research shows that child poverty can lead to chronic,
toxic stress that disrupts the architecture of the developing brain . . . ,” making
poverty perhaps “the single greatest threat to children’s healthy brain
110
development.” The HCV Program assists more families with children than all
111
other HUD rental assistance programs combined. In Louisiana, over half of
112
voucher households included children in 2014.

106. Id. at 1 n.1; see, e.g., Stacy Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial
Segregation: Lessons from Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 661 (2011) (discussing
the failure to create new rental housing units after Hurricane Katrina).
107. Kalima Rose & Laura Tuggle, Community Action: Bringing People Home to Stronger
Neighborhoods, THE NEW ORLEANS INDEX AT FIVE 7 (2010), https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/
files/NOLA_HOUSING_RECOVERY_2010.PDF.
108. BARBARA SARD & DOUGLAS RICE, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, CREATING
OPPORTUNITY FOR CHILDREN: HOW HOUSING LOCATION CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE (2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/creating-opportunity-for-children.
109. McClure, supra note 5, at 209.
110. VICKI MACK, THE DATA CTR., NEW ORLEANS KIDS, WORKING PARENTS, AND POVERTY
(2015), www.datacenterresearch.org/reports_analysis/new-orleans-kids-working-parents-and-poverty/.
111. BARBARA SARD & THYRIA ALVAREZ-SANCHEZ, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES
LARGE MAJORITY OF HOUSING VOUCHER RECIPIENTS WORK, ARE ELDERLY, OR HAVE
DISABILITIES (2011), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-2-11hous.pdf. For a detailed
analysis and set of recommendations regarding how housing vouchers can improve the housing choice
and well-being of families with children, see generally Barbara Sard & Douglas Rice, Creating
Opportunity for Children, How Housing Location Can Make a Difference (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-15-14hous.pdf.
112. Louisiana Fact Sheet: The Housing Choice Voucher Program, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y
PRIORITIES 1, http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-10-14hous-factsheets_la.pdf (last
updated July 6, 2015).
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B. Where Voucher Households Lived Pre-Katrina
Prior to Katrina, voucher households in the New Orleans metro area,
compared with their national counterparts, had less access to low-poverty
neighborhoods and were more concentrated in extreme-poverty
113
neighborhoods. HUD published a study in 2003 examining voucher location
patterns in the top fifty metropolitan areas using 1998 voucher data and 1990
114
census data. HUD found that nearly thirty percent of voucher households
115
nationally lived in low-poverty neighborhoods. This compared to six percent
116
of households in metro New Orleans. The HUD study also revealed that twice
as many metro New Orleans voucher households (twenty-one percent) lived in
neighborhoods of extreme poverty compared with their national counterparts
117
(ten percent).
HUD’s study also revealed racial disparities in voucher household access to
low-poverty neighborhoods, which credits the observation that “[b]y allowing
them to live in more socioeconomically integrated settings, American society
tends to afford the white poor a chance at upward mobility that it denies to
118
many of its poor black and Latino citizens.” For example, nineteen percent of
white voucher households used vouchers in low-poverty neighborhoods in
metro New Orleans, compared with only six percent of black households.
Conversely, the study reported that ten times as many black voucher
households (twenty-one percent) used vouchers in neighborhoods of extreme
poverty in metro New Orleans when compared with their white counterparts
119
(two percent).
Although voucher households in pre-Katrina New Orleans were more
concentrated in poor neighborhoods than their national counterparts, they were
less concentrated by poverty when compared with families in public housing. In
metro New Orleans, no public-housing families lived in low-poverty or even
middle-class neighborhoods; eighty-three percent of families lived in

113. For purposes of this article, “low-poverty neighborhoods” refer to census tracts with less than
ten percent of residents living below the poverty line. “Middle-class neighborhoods” refer to census
tracts with less than twenty percent of residents living below the poverty line. “High-poverty
neighborhoods” refer to census tracts with thirty percent or more residents living below the poverty
line. “Extreme-poverty neighborhoods” will refer to census tracts with forty percent or more residents
living below the poverty line.
114. DEBORAH J. DEVINE, ROBERT W. GRAY, LESTER RUBIN & LYDIA B. TAGHAVI, U.S. DEPT.
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER
LOCATION PATTERNS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS AND NEIGHBORHOOD WELFARE (Jan.
2003), http://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/location_paper.pdf.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The national figures include only voucher households with children present. Id. at 31.
118. SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 246 (2004).
119. Devine, supra note 117, at 36 tbl. III-5.
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neighborhoods of extreme poverty; and nearly all public-housing residents
120
(ninety-seven percent) lived in high-poverty neighborhoods.
C. Where Voucher Households Lived Post-Katrina
After Katrina, voucher households in the New Orleans metro area
continued to have less access to low-poverty neighborhoods than their national
counterparts, with notable clustering of Orleans Parish voucher users in certain
121
census tracts.
1. Housing Voucher Use in Metro New Orleans
A recent national study examining voucher household’s access to lowpoverty neighborhoods by metro area reported that nineteen percent of
voucher households in 2010 were located in low-poverty metropolitan census
122
tracts “with only very minimal encouragement . . .” The study describes this
figure as “a baseline . . . under the standard administration of the HCV
123
[Program].” By contrast, the study reports that nine percent of metro New
124
Orleans voucher households used vouchers in low-poverty tracts in 2010. New
Orleans in 2010 was in the bottom quartile of all U.S. metro areas with respect
to voucher household access to low-poverty neighborhoods and among the five
125
worst performing large metros (population greater than 800,000). The
performance of New Orleans reflects a regional phenomenon. The southcentral region of the United States has the lowest average percentage of
126
voucher holders living in low-poverty neighborhoods. However, the overall
trend in the New Orleans metro is toward less poverty concentration, whereas
the overall trend nationally is toward greater poverty concentration and less
127
access to low-poverty neighborhoods for voucher holders.
Additionally, white voucher households in metro New Orleans in 2010
continued to have much greater access to low-poverty neighborhoods than
black voucher households: twenty-one percent of whites used vouchers in low
128
poverty neighborhoods compared with only nine percent of blacks. By

120. Devine, supra note 117, at 40 tbl. III-9. See Turner & Popkin, supra note 40, at 2–3 for a
discussion of national research tracking former public-housing residents using vouchers to relocate.
121. See infra notes 122–125; 132–134 and accompanying text.
122. McClure, supra note 5, at 216–17.
123. Id. at 217.
124. Id. at 231.
125. Id. at 217–20.
126. Id. at 218–19.
127. McClure, Schwartz & Taghavi, supra note 10, at 223-25.
128. McClure contributed additional data analysis for this case study relating to HCV use at the
metro New Orleans level (on file with author). See A Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev. (2000, 2010), http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/about.html; U.S.
Census Bureau: Census 2010; Daniel H. Weinberg, U.S. Neighborhood Income Inequality in the 2005–
2009 Period, American Community Survey Reports, 2005–2009 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/
2011pubs/acs-16.pdf.
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contrast, six percent of whites used vouchers in neighborhoods of extreme
129
poverty compared with fifteen percent of blacks. Compared to the HUD
study, these post-Katrina data reveal that black voucher households in metro
New Orleans are trending toward less extreme-poverty concentration even
though there are still large numbers of vouchers (2,992) being used in extreme130
poverty neighborhoods.
The post-Katrina data also reveal that Hispanic household access to lowpoverty neighborhoods by 2010 in metro New Orleans was twelve percent; this
is slightly better than blacks, but worse than whites. Hispanic representation in
extreme-poverty neighborhoods, also twelve percent, was lower than blacks,
131
but higher than whites.
2. Housing Voucher Use in Orleans Parish
The question arises whether the tripling of vouchers in Orleans Parish
resulted in voucher households settling in clustered patterns. An examination of
voucher households reported by HUD in 2010 reveals that twenty-five percent
of voucher households used them in five percent of the census tracts (for a total
of 4,279 vouchers used in nine tracts). In each of these nine tracts, more than
300 vouchers were used, which is triple the amount that would be present if
vouchers were evenly distributed across all tracts. The number of vouchers
132
appearing in these tracts ranged from 318 to 843. Seven of the nine census
tracts are located in New Orleans East, six of the nine tracts in this group are in
high-poverty areas, and all of them are in neighborhoods with fewer than
133
twenty-five percent white residents.
When considering census tracts with 200 or more vouchers present, or
double the amount of vouchers that would be present if evenly distributed,
forty-two percent of vouchers are concentrated in thirteen percent of the census
tracts (for a total of 7,320 vouchers used in twenty-two census tracts). Overall,
nearly three-quarters of these census tracts are in high-poverty areas and more
129. Id. Nationally in 2010, the disparity was less stark but still notable, with about thirty percent of
whites in metro areas able to access low-poverty neighborhoods compared with seventeen percent of
blacks. McClure, supra note 5, at 221.
130. McClure contributed additional data analysis for this case study relating to HCV use at the
metro New Orleans level; see supra note 128.
131. Id.; A Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (2000, 2010),
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/about.html. McClure’s data also revealed that Hispanic
households comprised less than one percent of voucher households in 2000, whereas they comprised
four percent of voucher households in 2010.
132. See A Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (2010),
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/about.html; U.S. Census Bureau: Census 2010,
American Community Survey 2010 5-year estimates, http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/
summary-file.2010.html.
133. HUD uses Census 2000 tracts to report 2010 voucher data, whereas this case study uses Census
2010 census boundaries to report poverty and race data. Because some of the 2000 census boundaries
changed in 2010, this case study defines a 2000 tract as high poverty if any part of the tract was a highpoverty tract in 2010.
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than three-quarters of them are in neighborhoods with fewer than twenty-five
percent white residents. Maps accompanying an earlier release of this case study
show the distribution of vouchers across all census tracts in Orleans Parish
134
along with their corresponding poverty rates and percent white population.
John Lovett conducted an analysis of Orleans Parish voucher use at the
neighborhood level using 2010 data supplied by the Louisiana Office of
135
Community Development and the Data Center. He similarly found that “the
ten New Orleans neighborhoods with the highest number of voucher
households [ranging from 318 to 2,588 voucher holders] are overwhelmingly
African American, while nine out of the ten neighborhoods with the lowest
136
number of voucher households are predominantly white.” Lovett noted the
need for “further investigation to understand the effect this voucher
distribution surge is having on the quality of voucher holders’ lives and access to
137
opportunity.”
The literature reports that clustered use of vouchers in general can result
from “the manner through which voucher holders learn of available units and
138
willing landlords.” The clustering of vouchers in narrow geographies of
Orleans Parish underscores the need for recruitment of a broader pool of
landlords in high-opportunity neighborhoods and better counseling and search
assistance. Small landlord pools “relegate tenants, in effect, to a less competitive
139
submarket of landlords.”
3. Market Limitations on Voucher Household Mobility
It is easy to comprehend how the tripling in the number of vouchers used in
Orleans Parish between 2000 and 2010 could contribute to limited choice of
neighborhoods after Katrina. However, other market challenges also played a
role. One expert observes greater entry into low-poverty census tracts “in soft
[buyers’] markets and markets with a high percentage of total tracts that are
140
low-poverty tracts.” New Orleans voucher holders have been disadvantaged
because Orleans Parish has neither.
134. See Stacy Seicshnaydre & Ryan C. Albright, The New Orleans Index at Ten: Expanding Choice
and Opportunity in the Housing Choice Voucher Program, July 2015, figs. 1 & 2, https://s3.amazon
aws.com/gnocdc/reports/The+Data+CenterExpanding+Housing+Choice+in+New+ Orleans.pdf. HUD
uses Census 2000 tracts to report the HUD Picture of Subsidized Housing for the year 2010. However,
the Census Tract boundaries changed in Census 2010. To deal with this issue in the presentation of the
maps, Census 2010 tracts were used to display the colors for the poverty and race data, then Census
2000 tracts were layered over the Census 2010 tracts with a black outline but without fill colors; the
Census 2000 tracts were then labeled with the HUD Housing Choice Voucher data.
135. John A. Lovett, Tragedy or Triumph in Post-Katrina New Orleans? Reflections on Possession,
Dispossession, Demographic Change and Affordable Housing, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE
22, 33 nn.62–63 (2013).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 35.
138. McClure, Schwartz, & Taghavi, supra note 10, at 217.
139. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 41.
140. McClure, supra note 5, at 209.
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Post-Katrina estimates indicated that over half of the New Orleans region’s
141
rental housing was destroyed. Given the decreased supply and low vacancy
rates, there has been a significant increase in the share of renters who are costburdened both at the metro and individual parish levels. The metro area saw an
increase in households paying more than fifty percent of their household
income on rent and utilities from twenty-two percent of such households in
142
2004 to thirty-three percent in 2013. In Orleans Parish during the same time
period, the percentage of severely cost-burdened renters increased from twentyfour percent to thirty-seven percent, and in Jefferson Parish from twenty-two
143
percent to thirty-four percent. The median gross rents between 2004 and 2013
in the New Orleans metro rose from $760 to $908, in Orleans from $698 to $925,
144
and in Jefferson from $807 to $876.
New Orleans is also disadvantaged because it has fewer low-poverty census
tracts than the national average. In 2005 through 2009, the metro area had 126
census tracts, or thirty-two percent, meeting the low-poverty threshold,
145
compared with forty-four percent nationwide. The numbers are trending
146
positively in the New Orleans metro, but trending negatively nationally. When
considering the number of units in low-poverty neighborhoods with rents below
147
the voucher payment standard, about half of the rental units qualified.
The scarcity of rental units, historically high-poverty rates, and the massive
infusion of vouchers into the rental marketplace likely hampered voucher
households’ overall access to high-opportunity neighborhoods in post-Katrina
New Orleans. Another factor weighing heavily on the scale with respect to the
housing mobility of voucher households is housing discrimination.
4. Housing Discrimination as a Market Barrier: “Go Back to Your Section 8
Home”
As evidenced by the controversy surrounding a recent pool party in
McKinney, Texas, in which a white resident is alleged to have stated to a black
148
teen “Go back to your Section 8 home,” the stigma surrounding government
141. Turner, supra note 105, at 1 n.1.
142. NIHAL SHRINATH, VICKI MACK & ALLISON PLYER, THE DATA CTR., WHO LIVES IN NEW
ORLEANS AND METRO PARISHES NOW? 15 (2014).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 16.
145. Kirk McClure contributed additional data analysis for this case study based on U.S. Bureau of
the Census: American Community Survey, 2005–2009. Because HUD used Census 2000 census tracts to
depict HCV voucher use in 2010, and because some of these Census 2000 tracts changed in 2010,
McClure used 2005–2009 American Community Survey data so that the census boundaries in his
analysis would match the 2010 census boundaries used by HUD.
146. Kirk McClure contributed additional data analysis for this essay based on the U.S. Census
Bureau: American Community Survey, 2005–2009.
147. Id.
148. Emily Badger, How Section 8 Became a ‘Racial Slur’: A History of Public Housing in America,
WASH. POST (June 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/15/how-section8-became-a-racial-slur/. Media reports indicated that the police were called to the private pool party
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housing programs persists. Allegations of harassment against Section 8 tenants
149
by local governments have prompted HUD investigations. Section 8 is blamed
for neighborhood changes even in places where few voucher families have
150
entered. Research shows that small-scale, well-managed, subsidized housing
does not harm receiving neighborhoods; it is rather the clustering of vouchers in
151
high-poverty, minority neighborhoods that can be detrimental.
A significant barrier remains in the New Orleans metro with respect to
discrimination against voucher users and differential access to rental housing
opportunities generally on the basis of race. Given that over ninety percent of
152
voucher users in the New Orleans metro in 2010 were black, the existence of
rental discrimination on the basis of race serves as a real and persistent barrier
to voucher users’ access to housing opportunity. When considering the
prevalence of discrimination on the basis of voucher use, the barriers to
opportunity for voucher holders in New Orleans appear particularly acute.
Rental audits conducted by the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action
Center (GNOFHAC) both before and after Katrina have used a method of
153
investigation referred to as “testing.” This method engages matched pairs of
testers posing as home seekers who are equally qualified to rent the advertised
unit. Tester profiles and qualifications relevant to a rental transaction such as
income, career path, family type, and rental history, are held constant; only one
154
variable, such as race or voucher status, is measured.
A 2009 GNOFHAC audit measured landlord willingness to accept rental
vouchers. The audit revealed that landlords either refused to accept vouchers or
imposed insurmountable requirements for voucher holders in eighty-two
percent of the one hundred rental tests conducted in the greater New Orleans
155
area.
when it grew too large for the security guard to handle; video captured the responding officer using
what appeared to be excessive force to detain a black female teen guest. Carol Cole-Frowe & Richard
Fausset, Jarring Image of Police’s Use of Force at Texas Pool Party, N.Y. TIMES, (June 8, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/us/mckinney-tex-pool-party-dispute-leads-to-police-officersuspension.html.
149. See generally Jennifer Medina, Subsidies and Suspicion: Seeking a Better Life, California
Renters Encounter Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, August. 11, 2011, at A12 (noting that HUD will investigate
accusations of harassment against Section 8 tenants).
150. Badger, supra note 148.
151. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 55.
152. A Picture of Subsidized Households, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (2000, 2010),
http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/about.html.
153. For background information on fair housing testing methodology, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, EVIDENCE MATTERS, PAIRED TESTING AND THE HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION STUDIES (Spring/Summer 2014), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/
spring14/highlight2.html#title.
154. GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER, WHERE OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS
THE DOORS ARE LOCKED 11 (2014), www.gnofairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/11-06-14Where-Opp-Knocks-FINAL.pdf.
155. GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER, HOUSING CHOICE IN CRISIS
(2009), www.gnofairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/HousingChoiceInCrisis2009.pdf.
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A November 2014 audit measuring race-based rental discrimination
examined fifty advertised properties consisting of apartment complexes, multifamily residences, and single-family homes located in Orleans Parish
156
neighborhoods with fewer than thirty percent of families living in poverty.
The audit revealed that forty-four percent of African-American testers seeking
rental housing in low-poverty neighborhoods received less favorable treatment
than their white counterparts; this treatment included property owners and
managers who refused to respond to inquiries or show the apartment, failed to
provide rental applications, quoted less favorable terms and incentives, and
157
imposed stricter standards. The 2014 audit, with its focus on access to lowpoverty neighborhoods, not only provides evidence that racial discrimination in
the rental market persists, but also has troubling implications for the use of
housing vouchers as a tool for upward socioeconomic mobility. Thus, both racebased rental audits and voucher-based audits conducted post-Katrina in the
region reflect market barriers that limit housing choice for those attempting to
use vouchers to gain wider housing mobility and opportunity.
A 2009 GNOFHAC study examining the location of landlord listings
provided for voucher holders on HANO’s website demonstrated that sixty-two
percent of one- and two-bedroom units and seventy-three percent of threebedroom units were located in neighborhoods designated as “low and very low”
opportunity neighborhoods, when utilizing various indices of opportunity
developed by the Kirwin Institute, including: educational quality, economic
health and mobility, housing and neighborhood stability, public health access,
158
and environmental quality.
Although HANO does not guarantee the
suitability of properties listed on its website for voucher use, the fact that rental
units in low to very low opportunity neighborhoods are enjoying such
prominent placement on HANO’s website is cause for concern.
V
TOOLS FOR REFORM
The HCV Program has consistently fallen short of its potential to assist lowincome renters to access neighborhoods of greater opportunity. To that end,
this article offers the following recommendations:
A. Provide Data and Counseling Support
It stands to reason that data and counseling can assist households to make
housing choices that are informed by alternatives to high-poverty

156. GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER, supra note 154, at 10.
157. Id. at 12–14.
158. GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUSING ACTION CENTER, 2009 HOUSING CHOICE
VOUCHER PROGRAM (HCV) OPPORTUNITY MAPPING PROJECT (2007), www.gnofairhousing.org
/2009/12/07/opportunity-maps/.
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159

neighborhoods.
Successful mobility programs in Chicago, Dallas, and
Baltimore have paved the way for promising practices to be replicated on a
160
national basis.
A robust counseling program would include effective
administration of the HCV Program; recruitment and retention of landlords in
high-opportunity neighborhoods; pre-move counseling to help families learn
about unfamiliar neighborhoods and gain financial literacy; information about
schools, transportation, employment opportunities, and other neighborhood
resources; search assistance, including security deposit and transportation help;
161
and post-move counseling and supports. To be sure, the term “opportunity
neighborhoods” is not self-defining. Experts recommend avoiding proxies such
as race and poverty levels, which do not necessarily account for neighborhoods
in transition, and instead identifying multiple indicators of opportunity that
162
would be tracked over time, such as school performance.
B. Set Fair Market Rates at the Neighborhood Level
HUD should implement plans to set fair market rents at the neighborhood
or zip-code level rather than at the metro level, thereby expanding housing
choice and opportunity.
C. Administer Vouchers at the Regional Level
HUD has taken steps to make it easier for PHAs to form consortia so that
vouchers may be administered regionally, though regional administration
163
remains optional. Typically, vouchers are administered at the parish or county
level, requiring any voucher holder wishing to cross parish lines to apply to
164
multiple housing authorities with different offices and application procedures.
Moreover, the economies of scale introduced by regional administration could
leverage the funding of multiple state and local jurisdictions to offset the costs
associated with a robust counseling program.
159. An exhaustive review of the successful features of mobility programs designed to assist voucher
households’ moves to neighborhoods of greater opportunity is beyond the scope of this article. For a
comprehensive set of materials reporting expert insights on mobility program barriers, design, and
implementation, see PHILLIP TEGELER, MARY CUNNINGHAM, & MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER,
POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL, KEEPING THE PROMISE: PRESERVING AND ENHANCING
HOUSING MOBILITY IN THE SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM-CONFERENCE
REPORT OF THE THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HOUSING MOBILITY (2005).
160. See Lora Engdahl & Philip Tegeler, Regional Housing Mobility: A Report from Baltimore, 18
POVERTY & RACE at 1, 6–7 (2009).
161. Id.; Turner & Popkin, supra note 40, at 4; Turner, Williams, Kates, Popkin & Rabenhorst,
supra note 105, at 22.
162. See Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 37 (noting the opportunity mapping strategies of the
Kirwan Center [now Institute]); see also Engdahl & Tegeler, supra note 160, at 7 (noting that the
poverty rate determinants of MTO did not by themselves ensure access to high-performing schools).
163. Final Rule on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,322, 43,322–23 (July 16,
2015) (“Program participants should determine whether they want to collaborate with other program
participants and, if so, who they want to collaborate with.”).
164. See Darrah & DeLuca, supra note 95, at 27.
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D. Combat Discrimination against Voucher Households
Initiatives designed to combat housing discrimination should be supported,
and protections from discrimination on the basis of voucher status should be
implemented. One study found that voucher households in metro areas with
source-of-income protection laws “are less racially segregated, and less
clustered within specific census tracts, than [voucher] households in areas
165
without such laws.” The new Assessment Tool required by HUD as part of a
PHA’s AFH should lead to greater transparency as to where vouchers are being
used in a region relative to demographic data and other indicators of
opportunity. PHAs must monitor clustering and concentrations of vouchers and
advocates must monitor PHAs to ensure the HCV Program is promoting
housing choice throughout the region.
E. Increase the Supply of Affordable Housing Units in High-Opportunity
Neighborhoods
Programs like the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program can amplify
the impact of the HCV Program because tax-credit properties cannot
discriminate on the basis of voucher use. The greater number of tax-credit units
that are built in neighborhoods of opportunity, with access to jobs, good
schools, and healthy environments, the greater access to these neighborhoods
by HCV households. Also, placing affordable rental units under management
by a socially responsible third party could serve as another supply-side strategy
in urban and suburban neighborhoods with barriers to affordable housing
development or with landlords unwilling to deal directly with a housing
166
authority. Recruiting a broad pool of landlords is, therefore, especially vital.
F. Create a More Balanced Fair Housing Policy
In the current budgetary climate, the sure response to any recommended
fair housing reforms of the HCV program is that there is a lack of resources.
Mobility and housing choice expenditures, however, have been dwarfed by fifty
years of revitalization policies that some scholars and advocates describe as
167
“yield[ing] very little durable progress.” The above proposals for regional
administration would create efficiencies generating more funds for mobility
counseling. A more balanced funding apparatus that set aside at least some
annual funding for mobility programs without the need for litigation is

165. Metzger, supra note 8, at 545. See Tamica H. Daniel, Bringing Real Choice to the Housing
Choice Voucher Program: Addressing Voucher Discrimination Under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 98
GEORGETOWN L.J. 769, 777–79 (2010) (discussing the strengths and limitations of statutes and
ordinances prohibiting source-of-income-discrimination).
166. Briggs & Turner, supra note 40, at 41.
167. See Alex Polikoff, Housing Mobility: Why Is It So Controversial?, 24 POVERTY & RACE 3, 4
(2015) (borrowing a phrase from Pat Sharkey and responding to objection that spending money on
mobility means serving fewer families).
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168

recommended. Policy experts have recommended a set aside of “opportunity
vouchers” to help those low-income families living in the most segregated
regions of the country, who would like to move, exercise the choice to enter
169
communities with low poverty and high-performing schools.
VI
CONCLUSION
This post-Katrina case study substantiates the notion that persistent
structural flaws in the HCV Program must be corrected if the program is to
further fair housing and reach its full potential. Both before and after Hurricane
Katrina, voucher households in the New Orleans metro had less access than
170
their national counterparts to low-poverty neighborhoods of opportunity.
Racial disparities in access to low-poverty neighborhoods also persist in the
New Orleans HCV Program, and studies have documented discrimination
171
against both African Americans and voucher households generally. Despite
large numbers of vouchers still in use in extreme-poverty neighborhoods, the
trends are encouraging at the metro level, with higher percentages of black
voucher households in 2010 using vouchers in low-poverty census tracts than
reported in the pre-Katrina HUD Study, and a sharp drop in the percentage of
172
black voucher households living in neighborhoods of extreme poverty. Still,
many readily available policy tools exist to counteract the tendency of voucher
families to cluster in certain tracts, as is happening in Orleans Parish with
twenty-five percent of the vouchers in 2010 used in a mere five percent of
173
census tracts. The stakes are high for low-income children in the New Orleans
region and elsewhere. The HCV Program must achieve its original purpose of
reducing isolation of low-income renters and assist the next generation to
overcome the life-altering effects of poverty.

168. See, e.g., Elizabeth Julian, Mobility Works America, 24 POVERTY & RACE 1 (2015) (proposing
that mobility programs borrow funding model from “NeighborWorks America,” a community
development granting and training organization funded at over $200 million in 2012–2013).
169. Engdahl & Tegeler, supra note 160, at 6–7.
170. See supra notes 113–116; 122–125 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 119, 128 & Section III.C.4 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 116, 124, 130 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 132 & Part IV.

